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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) RUSSIAN AND U.S. DELEGATION RECEPTIONS,
FEBRUARY 4 AND 16, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 131 (SFO-GVA-VIII-054)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-018.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 4, 2010

Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:30 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

Meeting Date: February 16, 2010

Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The Russian delegation to the START Follow-on (SFO)
negotiations hosted a reception for the U.S. delegation on February
[1](#)4. The U.S. delegation later hosted a reception for the Russian

delegation on February 16. Discussions at these receptions covered Duma ratification, U.S. missile defense interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), the Leninsk and Svobodnyy facilities, future Russian conversion or elimination (CorE) procedures, release of information from data exchanges under SFO, heavy bombers, the utility of small group negotiating sessions, the status of the SFO negotiations, and biographical information. End summary.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Duma Will Do What It's Told; Regarding Missile Defense; Details on Leninsk and Svobodnyy Facilities; Russian CorE Procedures; Release of Information from Data Exchanges; Questions on Heavy Bombers; The Utility of Small Group Sessions; The Status of Negotiations; and Miscellaneous Biographical Data.

DUMA WILL DO WHAT IT'S TOLD

¶5. (S) In a discussion with Mr. Colby and Dr. Fraley at the Russian Mission on February 4, ADM (ret) Kuznetsov dismissed any potential problems with Duma ratification, stating that the Duma

would "do what it's told."

¶6. (S) At the U.S.-hosted reception on February 16, Amb Ries discussed with Mr. Koshelev the interaction with members of Congress and the State Duma with respect to SFO. Koshelev relayed that Senator Feinstein had written to Ambassador Antonov to thank him for hosting a lunch during the last session. (Begin comment: Feinstein visited the negotiations in Geneva in November 2009. End comment.) This letter had also included a number of substantive questions, and Antonov was now reflecting carefully on how to respond. According to Koshelev, Antonov had also received a letter a week earlier from members of the Communist Party in the lower house of the Duma. It was an unpleasant missive as it was accusatory and suggested that Russian negotiators were "not being tough enough" in the talks with the United States. The Communist Party wanted the delegation to come to a closed-door session and "explain itself." Koshelev said that so far the Russian delegation members had been able to avoid responding to this unwanted invitation, but he feared they might be unable to dodge it entirely.

REGARDING MISSILE DEFENSE

¶7. (S) At the Russian reception, Mr. Luchaninov told Mr. Brown that the Russian side could not understand why the U.S. side could not accept the Russian statement concerning the existing level of development and deployment of missile defense capabilities as the basis on which Russia was agreeing to the treaty. Brown said that as he understood the Russian position, a qualitative and quantitative change in the missile defense capabilities of the United States would serve as a rationale for Russian withdrawal from the treaty, and this statement could be seen by some as a Russian attempt to impose, indirectly, a limit on missile defense within the context of the SFO treaty. Luchaninov said that the Russian Federation had no problem with U.S. development of missile

defense capabilities as now envisaged.

¶8. (S) Luchaninov said that future cooperation with the United States on missile defense might be possible, noting there were some in Russia who were in favor of this cooperation, but he cautioned that the U.S. side needed to recognize the two sides had different views of the threats posed that would be countered by missile defense. He stressed it would not be acceptable to Russia to simply accept the threats as described by the United States; the identification of threats would have to be part of missile defense cooperation.

¶9. (S) In relation to the missile defense interceptor silos at Vandenberg, Gen Venevtsev asked Mr. Couch at the Russian reception why the U.S. side was introducing a new term, "modified," into the

treaty text and suggested that it should be a defined term. (Begin comment: The term "modified" was introduced by the U.S. side to ensure the former ICBM silos at Vandenberg, now used for ground-based interceptors, were properly described and grandfathered by the treaty. Since the date of the reception, that term has been deleted from the draft treaty text. End comment.) Couch briefly recounted the history of the missile defense sites at Vandenberg AFB and reminded Venevtsev of START's requirements for "conversion" of launchers and that, when the modifications were completed, the United States had offered a transparency visit to the sites. Venevtsev replied that "this was the least the United States could do."

¶10. (S) During the February 16 reception, General Poznikhir told Ms. Purcell the Russian delegation would provide a Russian text on telemetry the next day, after they finished writing it that evening. Purcell asked whether the Russian delegation would tell the U.S. delegation what it was willing to offer on telemetry if agreement was reached on the offense-defense issue. Poznikhir denied such a tight linkage between telemetry and missile defense, saying they would be able to clarify some telemetry issues but would not change their fundamental positions.

¶11. (S) Poznikhir asserted that, while missile defense was just a ratification issue for the United States, it was a security issue for Russia. Purcell countered that U.S. missile defense was not directed against Russia, and Russia was only imagining the threat. Poznikhir asserted that the threat was not imaginary and since he worked professionally on the issue, including with the Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, he knew whereof he spoke. Poznikhir acknowledged the United States was justified in defending itself against North Korean missiles, but he said that missile defense in Europe was another matter. He asserted that Iran did not have missiles that could reach Europe and would not have them for a long time. Purcell countered that U.S. assessments were very different. Poznikhir went on to say that Russia did not threaten the United States.

DETAILS ON LENINSK AND SVOBODNYI FACILITIES

¶12. (S) During the Russian-hosted reception on February 4, Purcell asked Mr. Smirnov, whom Antonov had described as the Russian delegation expert on the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan, for his views on the draft agreed statement on Leninsk that the United States had tabled at the beginning of this session. Smirnov said

he considered the agreed statement unnecessary. He added that Russia would provide notifications on its missiles with or without an agreed statement and indicated the Russian delegation would be willing to discuss such notifications. He argued further that an agreed statement on Leninsk would require Kazakhstan's signature.

¶13. (S) Also that evening, Purcell queried Mr. S. Shevchenko about progress toward converting the former Svobodnyy ICBM base into a space launch facility. He replied that work was ongoing to develop it into a completely modern launch facility that would replace Baikonur (Leninsk) in Kazakhstan. It would be renamed the Vostochnyy Cosmodrome. All the work was still on paper, however, and it would take a long time to complete. The first space launches were planned for 2015. S. Shevchenko said the intention was for the facility to be used solely for civilian space launches; only Plesetsk would be used for missile test launches. Asked about space launch vehicles (SLVs) based on ICBMs, S. Shevchenko said that all such SLVs, such as the Dnepr (SS-18) and Rokot (SS-19), would be phased out by 2015 and not launched from Svobodnyy. After that time, SS-18s and SS-19s would simply be eliminated and not launched.

RUSSIAN C OR E PROCEDURES

¶14. (S) On February 4, S. Shevchenko told Purcell that he once visited Utah to witness a Trident SLBM elimination by explosion. The Russian side thereafter began developing an analogous elimination facility to dispose of defective rocket motors by means of explosion. Such a site was being developed by Roskosmos at an Air Force training range in the Chita Oblast'. (Begin comment: During the Fall 2009 negotiation session, the Russian delegation referred to this facility as Telemba. End comment.) S. Shevchenko said that Roskosmos was working on infrastructure improvements, such as strengthening the roads and constructing some buildings, but expected to finish the work this year and to declare the site as a CorE facility under the SFO treaty. He added that Ministry of Defense approval was required for this, but Roskosmos had completed all the paperwork which was currently awaiting signature by Chief of General Staff Makarov. He also noted that defective rocket motors could not be eliminated safely at Perm' or Krasnoarmeysk, so a new facility was needed.

RELEASE OF INFORMATION FROM DATA EXCHANGES

¶15. (S) On February 4, Luchaninov told Brown he was surprised the U.S. side did not appear to appreciate the dangers inherent in releasing to the public detailed information about the locations of strategic offensive arms, referring to ongoing discussions on Article VIII. Brown responded that he did not believe the United States would be releasing any more to the public than had been released under START. Luchaninov responded that these were different times, and he focused specifically on information about the storage and movement of nuclear weapons, noting that there had

been close contacts between Russian and U.S. security experts on ensuring the physical security of nuclear weapons, but the release of information about the location, storage and movement of information could undercut those joint efforts. Brown said that, with respect to many notifications, including transits, those notifications were provided after the fact, so even if such

information were released it should not pose a current problem. Luchaninov said that the problem was that any information about nuclear weapons and their locations and movements could be used by terrorists to plan attacks because it is likely that established security protocols used in past movements between facilities would be the same as those used in the future, and the terrorists could then make accurate predictions as to where the weapons were headed or located at any given time. Luchaninov said that both he and Venevtsev were experts on counter-terrorism issues related to the protection of information and were following these issues very carefully both here in Geneva as well in their jobs in Moscow. In terms of current threats facing both Russia and the United States, Luchaninov mentioned religious fundamentalism/ extremism as the source of such threats as bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism, and "dirty bombs," noting that it was not necessarily just Islamic fundamentalism and extremism that constituted the threat.

¶16. (S) On February 16, Mr. Taylor questioned Kuznetsov as to why Russia was unwilling to release July 2009 START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) information, which was releasable to the public in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty. Taylor explained to Kuznetsov that the United States had proposed using that data to populate the new treaty database as a compromise since the data was already in the public domain. Kuznetsov offered that there were major problems with using the data from the START MOU exchange. Specifically, the counting rules in the new treaty were much different, and it would be very difficult if not impossible to match the numbers with the categories in the new database. Additionally, the circumstances were much different today than in the early 1990s when the sides negotiated the START Treaty. At that time, the two nations were concerned about protecting information from each other. Today, Russia was primarily concerned with protecting its information from third parties like terrorists. Russia was not saying that the United States could not release its own information, but Russia would not be a party to releasing its own information.

REGARDING HEAVY BOMBERS

¶17. (S) Conversing with Taylor on February 16, Kuznetsov explained his concerns with non-deployed heavy bombers, picking up on the conversation from earlier in the day at the Definitions Working Group meeting (Reftel). Kuznetsov said that the Russian delegation's concerns were with B-1B heavy bombers and when the United States would be removing them from the treaty. Until all the B-1B heavy bombers were converted they must be considered deployed heavy bombers. Taylor assured Kuznetsov that upon entry into force of the treaty, should there be any B-1B heavy bombers

equipped for nuclear armaments, they would be declared as deployed heavy bombers. However, when any single B-1B heavy bomber completed its conversion, it would become a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Furthermore, that bomber would not be considered a non-deployed heavy bomber. The only way a heavy bomber was considered to be non-deployed was if that heavy bomber was a test heavy bomber or if it was a heavy bomber that was based at a repair facility for maintenance. The key attribute for a non-deployed heavy bomber was that it was equipped for nuclear armaments. Kuznetsov agreed, saying this was his view of what constituted a non-deployed heavy bomber. However, there were some on the Russian delegation that wanted to capture all B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments as non-deployed. They used subparagraph 6(c) of Article III as their justification. Taylor said that this was not the case. Subparagraph 6(c) defined when the death certificate for the type of heavy bomber would be issued. Until the last heavy bomber of a type was eliminated or converted in accordance with the Core Part to the Protocol, the

converted heavy bombers would continue to be subject to the treaty, but as heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Kuznetsov agreed, saying that he would discuss this with his delegation. Kuznetsov offered that he did not believe there needed to be any limitation on the number of non-deployed heavy bombers with the exception of the limit of 10 test heavy bombers. If a Party needed to have a heavy bomber in maintenance, it should be permitted to be in maintenance. The Parties could see from national technical means (NTM) that a bomber was undergoing maintenance.

118. (S) Also that evening, LT Lobner spoke with Col Pischulov regarding heavy bomber technical characteristics. Pischulov asked whether the U.S. side had considered including any numerical technical characteristics for Section VIII of Part Two of the Protocol. Lobner replied that he had indeed spoken with some of the U.S. inspectors on numerous occasions and they had consistently asked why any of this data was required. Pischulov admitted he was asking the same question to his delegation, stating there was one individual who was insisting this information be retained. He added that the United States was doing a "good job" making his case for him by insisting the START-like information was not required for the new treaty.

THE UTILITY OF SMALL GROUP SESSIONS

119. (S) Col Petrov told Mr. Buttrick the Russian delegation believed the small group meetings between the sides on the technical conforming of Part Five of the Protocol on Inspection Activities were extremely useful in facilitating the work for the Inspection Protocol Working Group. (Begin comment: These two-on-two "pre-conforming" meetings provided additional insights beyond the discourse during formal meetings. For example, on one occasion Petrov informed Buttrick that the recently deployed RS-24 road-mobile ICBM would present "challenges" for the proposed inspection regime. End comment.) Buttrick agreed with Pischulov's observation about these small meetings, and suggested that a

similar process could be instituted for the detailed procedures contained in the nine Parts of the Annex on Inspection Activities. Petrov confirmed it was a good idea and stated that he thought Col Ilin and others on the Russian delegation might be receptive to this approach. Petrov stated he believed the drafts of the Annex provided by the U.S. delegation were very good, but there were some more detailed procedures related to inspections that would be useful to discuss at the technical inspector level.

120. (S) Buttrick asked whether it would be possible for Petrov to remain in Geneva at the end of the month when the Russian delegation planned to return to Moscow to continue technical discussions. Petrov said that in the past, Antonov had been reluctant to leave anyone in Geneva when the Russian delegation had returned to Moscow. However, he suggested that if Buttrick could mention this idea to A/S Gottemoeller, perhaps she could raise this approach with Antonov. He expressed optimism that Antonov might agree to it.

THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

¶21. (S) On February 4, Luchaninov told Brown that many on the Russian side believed the U.S. side was not living up to the Mullen-Makarov agreements and that the U.S. side did not appear to be in a hurry to finish up work on the treaty. Brown responded that this was not the case and that there were a number of reasons why both sides wanted to conclude in the near future, including the NPT Review Conference in early May and the interest in submitting the treaty to their respective legislative bodies this summer.

¶22. (S) Mr. Leontiev commented to Mr. McConnell at the reception on February 16 that "some" on the Russian delegation in Geneva felt the United States was not telling the truth about the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow, but Leontiev admitted that had Russia held a final plenary to discuss the results, this perception might have been avoided.

¶23. (S) During the U.S.-hosted reception on February 16, Koshelev mentioned to Ries that it had been difficult to assemble the Russian delegation. To get Generals Orlov and Pozhikhir, who were the best authorities in their respective areas, Presidential permission had been required to take them away from their regular duties. Koshelev shared the view that it was important to secure this treaty now because if the opportunity slipped by there would not be another chance.

¶24. (S) Mr. Rudenko, commenting on Antonov's remark during the February 16 toasts that he hoped the treaty would be done by

February 28 said to Ries that this was "the word" now in his delegation.

¶25. (S) On February 16, Leontiev told McConnell that, depending upon the progress of negotiations at the end of February, the Russian delegation might remain in Geneva "for another week" rather than returning to Moscow for a scheduled break.

¶26. (S) On February 16, Mr. Lyasovskiy complained to a U.S. translator about the slow pace of work in Geneva over the previous week caused by weather in Washington. Lyasovskiy claimed Moscow had a large number of people working "24 hours a day" to support the negotiating team in Geneva.

MISCELLANEOUS BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

¶27. (S) S. Shevchenko's wife was at the Russia-hosted reception and stated that this was her first time in Geneva. They said they have been married 32 years, with a son aged 30 and a daughter in her late 20s. They stated that both their children remain unmarried. Their daughter has been working at a medical facility in Atlanta but has rejected their offer to stay permanently because she wants to return home.

¶28. (S) S. Shevchenko said he is in charge of implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in Russia. He has met frequently with Senators Nunn and Lugar, and once hosted a Senate delegation visit to Russian CTR sites that included then-Senator

Obama. He stated there were six divisions subordinate to him, and Smirnov was in charge of the division responsible for elimination of strategic offensive arms. S. Shevchenko also said he once briefed the U.S. House of Representatives on the CTR Program. He supported continuation of the program and believed it was helpful to both countries, but he perceived most of the U.S. Congressmen were negative about it and believed that Russia, as a great power, should pay for such measures. He added that Russia's plans for CTR also require approval by the Russian legislature.

¶29. (S) Venevtsev noted that his youngest daughter was graduating from law school this year and that she was concerned about finding a job.

¶30. (S) When asked by Couch on February 4 who was running the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in his absence, Col Ryzhkov replied that he was returning to Moscow for a week beginning February 5, citing the reason that his "inbox" was overflowing.

¶31. (S) Ms. Polyntseva was from Tyumen. She studied at Tyumen State University and then went to St. Petersburg for her graduate work. She related that she studied English, French, and German and that this was her first time working arms control issues.

¶32. (S) Ms. Shustova mentioned that this was her first time working arms control issues. She stated that she recently celebrated turning 24 and had a close relationship with another Russian interpreter, Violetta Evarovskaya.

¶33. (S) Ms. Fuzhenkova stated on February 4 that she has an older brother and was serving as the Executive Secretary of the Russian delegation until their full-time Executive Secretary returned to Geneva from Moscow.

¶34. (S) In his discussion with Mr. Elliott, Koshelev mentioned that he was an avid photographer and photography buff.

¶35. (S) Mr. Kamenskiy stated that he had two daughters, one was 19 and the other 26.

¶36. (S) Poznikhir told Ries that prior to joining the Soviet military he wanted to become an artist. He started art school but quit when he was 18 to attend military school. While there, he met his wife, a well-known painter. He mentioned she was in an artists' league and had sold her works in Germany and France. Asked about her style, he said she painted a lot of flowers and the whole house was her studio. Poznikhir also confirmed that he still painted as well.

¶37. (S) In his discussion with Purcell at the U.S.-hosted reception, Lyasovski said he was a Navy Commander (Captain 2nd Rank). He was born in Gadzhiyev, adjacent to the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and spent his childhood there. His father also served in the Navy, but no longer lived near Yagelnaya. Lyasovski said he served on submarines for part of his career. He also was an escort at the last U.S. START inspection in Russia, and participated on the last Russian inspection in the United States in early December 2009. He speaks English.

¶38. (S) During one of his meetings with A/S Gottemoeller, Antonov mentioned that he was born in Omsk. He also mentioned that he had a brother who had taught him how to play chess and that he enjoys playing chess with that brother.

¶39. (S) Mr. Ivanov told Couch that he planned to be in Washington for the April Nuclear Summit.

¶40. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
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